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The term political economy went out of fashion decades ago because 
economists wanted to concentrate on rigorous analysis of the strictly 
economic aspects of problems. The term has come back in favor, 
however, for many of us concerned with problems of development. We 
recognize that we simply cannot afford to ignore the political dimen 
sion that is so important to our understanding of the real world 
problems and opportunities. LasswelTs classic definition of politics  
who gets what, when, and how? is also a fine definition of the political 
economy of development. In brief, political constraints are as impor 
tant as the scarcity of economic resources in determining those things 
that are feasible and not merely desirable.
In addressing this large topic, I want to deal in summary fashion with 
three key questions.
My first question is, simply, why focus on agricultural and rural 
development?
Second, why should we in this country be concerned about the develop 
ment problems of Kenya, India, and other third world countries?
Third, what have economists in general and this particular 
agricultural economist learned in the last 40 years about the critical 
elements or ingredients of successful strategies for agricultural and rural 
development?




For the less-developed countries that still have very low incomes  
the Indias, Kenyas, or Indonesias in contrast with middle-income coun 
tries such as South Korea, Brazil, or Taiwan, some 60 to 80 percent 
of the population and labor force still depend on agriculture for their 
livelihood for employment and income. 1 And it is not necessary to 
dwell on the fact that food is one of the most basic of * 'Basic Human 
Needs." (See Mellor and Johnston 1984.)
On my second question, as to why we as Americans should be con 
cerned about the development problems of third world countries, there 
are many answers. Let me mention two that I find persuasive.
The first answer boils down to this: We are part of the problem and 
therefore have a moral, a human obligation to try to be part of the solu 
tion. The most obvious way in which we are part of the problem is 
that we the U.S., the countries of Western Europe, and the World 
Health Organization and other international institutions (including the 
Kellogg, Rockefeller, and Ford Foundations) are mainly responsible 
for the explosive growth rates of population that became universal among 
the less-developed countries during the decades following World War 
n. I am referring, of course, to the opening up of access to immuniza 
tion programs and other modern public health technologies and to modern 
medical knowledge. This lowering of death rates above all by reduc 
ing infant and child mortality has been a blessing for the families that 
have been spared the wastage of human life when, as was often the case, 
one out of three infants died before the age of five. Like many transfers 
of modern technology, however, it has been a two-edged sword. We 
have learned that it is much easier for external interventions to bring 
about a rapid reduction in death rates than in birth rates. Clearly, it 
is the dramatic decline in death rates from crude death rates of 40 to 
50 per thousand to current levels of 10 to 25 per thousand that has 
given rise to the explosive growth of population of the past 35 years. 
(Johnston and Clark 1982, pp. 47-60.)
Again, this is a problem that applies particularly to the low-income 
countries. It also applies with special force to the countries of tropical 
Africa and not only because so many of the low-income countries are 
in the region. In fact, tropical Africa is the one region in the world where
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rates of population growth are continuing to increase because death rates 
are continuing to fall and birth rates are virtually unchanged.
The situation in Kenya epitomizes the way in which the task of rais 
ing per capita incomes has been made exceedingly difficult because of 
the emergence and persistence of very high rates of population growth. 
During the demographic transition in Western Europe and Japan, the 
period of rapid population growth was charaterized by rates of increase 
of about 1.5 percent, compared to an estimated rate of 4 percent in 
Kenya. It is the nature of population growth to proceed at a compound 
rate. An upsurge in infant and child survival this year means an up 
surge in the rate of increase in women of child-bearing age beginning 
15 to 20 years from now. Hence the momentum of population growth 
that demographers emphasize. A growth rate of 4 percent means that 
a population will double in just over 17 years and will increase seven 
times in 50 years. At first glance, a population growth rate of 2 percent 
doesn't seem all that different a population doubling time of 35 years 
instead of 17. But continuation of a 2 percent compound rate for 50 
years implies an increase of' 'only" 2.7 times compared to a sevenfold 
increase with a 4 percent growth rate.
Demographic projections for Kenya offer a striking example. For the 
55-year period 1969 to 2024, the "most likely" set of assumptions point 
to an increase in Kenya's population from 11 million to 64 million. Those 
projections also considered the prospective change in the urban-rural 
composition of the country's labor force. Assuming continued rapid 
growth of the urban workforce, the rural workforce is projected to 
decline from 87 percent of the total in 1969 to 65 percent in 2024. In 
spite of the projected sixteen/old increase in the population of working 
age in urban areas, however, the rural workforce would still increase 
fourfold over that 55-year period (Shah and Willekens 1978). Those 
projections emphasize an important structural characteristic of coun 
tries with rapid population growth and where the share of the popula 
tion dependent on agriculture is still very high.
But before I turn to the implications of these structural/demographic 
characteristics on the choice of an agricultural strategy, let me mention
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another fundamental reason why I believe that it is important for the 
U.S. to continue to play an important role in providing economic and 
technical assistance for the contemporary low-income countries. 
Throughout most of human history poverty was widespread, but it was 
not perceived as a problem in the way it is today. Instead, it was seen 
as part of the natural order. ' 'The poor are always with us." Their plight 
should be alleviated by charity, but poverty was not viewed as a condi 
tion that could and should be eliminated by well-designed and vigorously 
implemented development efforts. However, with the remarkable ad 
vances that have been made in science and technology, the develop 
ment goal of eliminating poverty has become a real possibility, not mere 
ly a Utopian dream. (See Simon 1984.)
I turn now to the question of what economists and this agricultural 
economist have learned about the development process during the past 
40 years. And that will bring me back to the implications of those struc 
tural/demographic characteristics of today's low-income developing 
countries.
But first I want to draw on my work in Japan in the years immediate 
ly after World War n. With the benefit of a lot of hindsight, I see that 
I am very fortunate to have been influenced so strongly by Japan's ex 
perience as my implicit "model" of agricultural development. During 
the critically formative period of the late 19th century and the early 
decades of the 20th century, increases in agricultural productivity con 
tributed in some very important ways to the overall economic develop 
ment of Japan. (See Ohkawa, Johnston, and Kaneda 1969; Johnston 
and Kilby 1975, chap. 5.) Three features of that experience were 
especially significant.
1. Agricultural production was increased within the unchanged 
organizational framework of Japan's existing small-scale farming system. 
Between 1880 and 1960, Japan's agricultural production increased about 
3-1/2 times, slightly more than the increase in the U.S. over the same 
80-year period. Because of technological change, specifically increases 
in the productivity of the existing on-farm resources of land and labor, 
this was achieved with remarkably small demands on the critically scarce 
resources of capital and foreign exchange.
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2. Most of the nation's farmers were involved in increases in 
agricultural productivity associated with the use of improved crop 
varieties, fertilizers and other types of working capital but remarkably 
little investment in farm machinery or other types of long-term capital 
investment. Technological change related to high-yield, fertilizer- 
responsive crop varieties was the driving force in increasing agricultural 
productivity. And the technical innovations and new purchased inputs 
were divisible. Therefore they could be used efficiently by small farmers 
subject to a severe purchasing power constraint. And the typical farmer 
unavoidably faced a purchasing power constraint. The cash income ac 
cruing to the agricultural sector was limited because of the struc 
tural/demographic characteristics emphasized earlier. When the number 
of farm households is still large relative to the domestic population depen 
dent on purchased food, the cash income accruing to the average farm 
unit is inevitably small. When a country's pattern of agricultural develop 
ment is dualistic, so that a relatively small number of atypically large 
and capital-intensive farm enterprises account for the lion's share of 
commercial production, those large farms escape the purchasing power 
constraint. But that is at the expense of intensifying the cash income 
and purchasing power constraint for the great majority of small farm 
units.
3. Agricultural and industrial growth went forward together in a pro 
cess of concurrent growth. As the overwhelmingly agrarian character 
of the Japanese economy was gradually transformed by the process of 
economic growth, there were positive interactions between agriculture 
and industry. Moreover, the concurrent progress in agriculture and in 
dustry led to decentralized industrial development of a "semi-modern" 
industrial sector that relied upon relatively simple, capital-saving, labor- 
using technologies, which made possible more rapid growth of output 
in both sectors.
I want to dwell particularly on the first and second factors and the 
importance of technological change. All of the speakers in this seminar 
series are, I believe, in agreement on the great importance of 
technological change. This potential importance of technological change 
as a source of agricultural growth has some very important implica 
tions for the design of development strategies.
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One terribly important implication is that we need to be as concern 
ed with investments in human and institutional resources as in physical 
investments such as construction of irrigation systems or building fac 
tories for manufacturing farm equipment. James Bonnen, a distinguished 
professor of agricultural economics at Michigan State University, has 
emphasized that agricultural progress in the U.S. has been the result 
of interactions within a system of developmental institutions: farmers 
and their organizations, the United States Department of Agriculture 
and the land-grant colleges and universities, the Federal-State 
Agricultural Research and Extension programs, private sector firms 
engaged in the marketing and processing of farm products and the 
manufacture and distribution of farm inputs, and the federal and state 
political institutions involved in the formulation of agricultural policy. 
(See Bonnen 1987.) Experience in the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and many 
other countries has demonstrated that efficient agricultural progress 
depends on the interacting effects of farm-level factors and what, for 
lack of a better term, I refer to as socially determined factors. The farm- 
level factors include the responsiveness of farmers to incentives and 
their investments of time and money in land improvement, in equip 
ment, in fertilizers and other forms of working capital, and in acquir 
ing knowledge and skills. The socially determined factors include educa 
tional institutions, investments in agricultural research, extension, and 
infrastructure, macroeconomic policies (e.g., monetary policy and in 
terest rates), and a host of factors affecting the marketing of farm prod 
ucts and the distribution of inputs.
The twofold implication of recognizing the great potential importance 
of technological change concerns the need for investments in the various 
forms of capital physical, human, and institutional to be reasonably 
well-balanced. It is easy to state the economic principle. The rate of 
return on the last dollar invested in each type of capital should be ap 
proximately equal. But to realize that ideal in practice is enormously 
difficult. The emphasis by Hayami and Ruttan (1985) on "induced in 
novation" and the importance of avoiding price distortions is an im 
portant part of the answer. However, the decisions to make the long- 
term investment in building supporting institutions, including educa 
tional institutions to train agricultural scientists and administrators, re-
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quires a vision, even a faith, that goes beyond perceiving trends in 
relative prices. Lessons of past historial experience can be enormously 
helpful provided that they are well understood and properly interpreted. 
I believe that I have been very fortunate to have had an opportunity 
to learn about Japan's experience when I was still very young and im 
pressionable. Every country confronts a unique set of problems. But 
I am persuaded that Japan's past experience is of much greater relevance 
to today's developing countries than the historical experience of the 
United States.
Another important lesson of past experience concerns the relative ad 
vantages of the public and private sectors in achieving successful 
agricultural development. The first proposition that I would stress is 
that we have to move beyond a doctrinaire faith in either government 
planning and direct action by government, or the equally blind faith 
in the private sector and "the magic of the market place." Experience 
in the U.S., in Japan and in many other countries demonstrates that 
successful agricultural development depends on an interacting system 
of public and private institutions.
There are good theoretical reasons and much evidence to support the 
view that independent private firms have a comparative advantage over 
public agencies in carrying out essentially commercial functions such 
as production or marketing farm products or distributing farm inputs. 
This is essentially because the hierarchical techniques of decisionmak- 
ing and operating within a bureaucracy are at a disadvantage as com 
pared to the greater flexibility and the capacity and motivation for cost- 
minimization that characterize private firms responding to price and 
profit signals within a market system. It is equally important to stress, 
however, that a number of the socially determined factors that are of 
critical importance depend upon the public sector. This is because public 
agencies are needed to make available critical public goods such as educa 
tion, agricultural research, extension, and family planning services. It 
is a defining characteristic of public goods and services that they will 
be provided in less than the socially optimal amount if their availability 
depends on private firms responding to private demands. Even from 
a strictly economic point of view, society's benefits from investing in
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education, for example, exceed the private returns accruing to those 
who receive the education.
Finally, I want to make a few comments about the role of food aid. 
This is a complex and controversial topic. Some people who stress that 
the world's food problems are "merely a matter of distribution" con 
clude that sending our "surplus food" is a neat and simple answer. 
Food aid shipments are essential for famine relief. They are not the 
answer to the fundamental problems of poverty. And it is their poverty 
that makes poor countries so vulnerable to famine.
I sympathize with the prime minister who wanted to find a one-handed 
economist because he (or was it she?) was fed up with "on the one 
hand, on the other hand" answers. But there's no getting away from 
the complexity that characterizes food aid. Food aid can be used to pro 
mote development. It can and, I believe, often does have adverse ef 
fects on incentives to increase food production in a low-income, develop 
ing country. But rather than spend a lot of time trying to spell out the 
conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for food aid to have a positive 
impact, let me give you, as an illustration, my view on the food aid 
balance sheet for India. It seems to me that for the 1950s and up to 
the mid-1960s, it is difficult to say whether food aid yielded significant 
net benefits for India. Its greatest value was probably in saving foreign 
exchange that could be used to finance other imports including, for ex 
ample, equipment for fertilizer factories and for irrigation facilities. 
But its availability undoubtedly had an adverse effect on farm prices 
and farmers' incentives. In addition, it probably weakened the resolve 
of the government to face up to the country's agricultural problems. 
There is no doubt in my mind that dollar-for-dollar the food aid was 
less valuable than, say, the investments that enabled some of our land- 
grant universities to assist in establishing a network of agricultural univer 
sities in India and in creating a more effective national agricultural 
research system. But that ignores two important political economy dimen 
sions of the issue.
First, there is no doubt that to some extent the food aid was addi 
tional to other forms of aid. As long as agricultural "surpluses" are 
created as a by-product of our agricultural price support programs,
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there is bound to be pressure in Congress to convert those "costly and 
burdensome surpluses" into a "valuable food resource." Second, I am 
convinced that the blunt way in which Lyndon B. Johnson carried out 
his "short tether" policy in making aid available to India during the 
acute famine in 1966 and 1967 resulting from two successive years of 
drought had powerful and positive consequences. There was great resent 
ment among Indian politicians, policy makers, and officials at many levels 
at being treated in that way, e.g., in imposing many harsh "conditions 
precedent." Indeed the Indians involved were so infuriated that the 
episode created a resolve to never again be so dependent on food relief 
shipments. And fortunately the prior investments in strengthening In 
dia's human and institutional resources as well as U.S. and World Bank 
investments in expanding irrigation facilities and fertilizer manufacturing 
capacity meant that India's interacting system of developmental institu 
tions could meet the challenge of virtually ending India's dependence 
on imported food.
In recent years, there has been a very substantial increase in food 
aid to countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Johnston et al. 1987, chap. 2). 2 
Because of the tight budget situation in the U.S., together with current 
concern over the financial difficulties of American farmers as a result 
of the recent decline in agricultural exports and in farm prices, there 
is pressure to further expand food aid shipments; and exaggerated claims 
are being made about the benefits to be realized from such shipments. 
(See, for example, Reutlinger and Katona-Apte 1987.) Providing food 
aid as a substitute for commercial imports would help to ease the serious 
balance-of-payments problems faced by countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
As noted by Timmer in his chapter, however, using food aid to replace 
commercial imports is contrary to the intent and the regulations that 
are supposed to govern food aid programs of the U.S. and other coun 
tries. Moreover, sustained solutions to Africa's serious food and 
agricultural problems require economic and technical assistance to sup 
port the strengthening of national agricultural research systems and 
postsecondary educational institutions for training agricultural scien 
tists and administrators, together with investments in expanding, 
rehabilitating, and maintaining rural transport networks and other rural.
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infrastructure. Use of a certain amount of food aid for rural works pro 
jects could have a positive developmental impact, although such pro 
jects make substantial demands on scarce administrative and planning 
capacity. It is essential to recognize that food aid cannot be a substitute 
for supporting the long-term institution-building that is so desperately 
needed in Sub-Saharan Africa.
NOTES
1. The distinctive problems of such "late-developing" countries are examined in Johnston and 
Kilby (1975) and Johnston and Clark (1982).
2. For historical reasons, Africa has not been the focus of U.S. economic assistance. Since 1978, 
U.S. assistance to Africa has amounted to a little over 10 percent of the country's foreign aid 
to all regions; but prior to 1978, Africa received only about 5 percent of the total. For the six 
countries Senegal.Nigeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, and Malawi included in the World 
Bank's study of Managing Agricultural Development in Africa (MADIA), AID's bilateral assistance 
for projects and programs during the period 1963-84 amounted to $905 million in constant 1983 
dollars or only a little more than the $836 million provided as food aid (Johnston et al. 1987, 
chap. 2, table 3).
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